

1. If the substance of all things
is not to be found anywhere,
your assertion which is devoid
of substance is not able to refute substance.
2. Moreover, if that statement exists substantially,
your earlier thesis is refuted.
There is an inequality to be explained,
and the specific reason for this should be given.
3. If you were of the opinion
that it is like "do not make a sound,"
this would not be adequate,
for in this case there is the prevention
of a future sound by an existing one.
4. If you thought that the negation's negation
is also like this, that would indeed not be correct.
Thus your thesis, not mine,
Is corrupted by the specific characteristic.
5. If you deny objects after having
apprehended them through perception,
that perception by which the objects
are perceived does not exist.
6. Inference, testimony, and likeness
are refuted by perception,
as well as the objects to be established
by inference, testimony, and example.
7. People who know the state of things
think that auspicious phenomena
have an auspicious substance.
This distinction also holds for the other things.
8. The phenomena of liberation have the substance of phenomena of liberation.
The same holds for those things which have been mentioned
in connection with the state of things,
as well as for those things which are not phenomena of liberation.
9. And if there was no substance,
there would also not even
be the name "insubstantiality of things,"
for there is no name without a referent.
10. Rather, substance exists,
yet the substance of things does not exist.
It has to be explained to what this
thingless substance belongs.

11. To the extent to which the negation
"there is no pot in the house"
is precisely a negation of an existent,
your negation is a negation of an existing substance.
12. Now as this substance does not exist,
what is negated by that statement of yours?
For the negation of a non-existent
is accomplished without words.
13. As ignorant people wrongly perceive water in a mirage,
in the same way there would be
a wrong perception for you in this case,
for a non-existent object is negated.
14. Yet, while it exists in this way,
there are these six things:
the perception, the perceived, and the perceiver of that object;
the negation, the object of negation, and the negator.
15. But if there is just
no perception, no perceived, and no perceiver,
then there is certainly
no negation, no object of negation, and no negator.
16. While there is neither negation,
object of negation, nor negator,
all things are established,
and so is their substance.
17. Your reason is not established.
Because there is no substance,
where then does your reason come from?
Moreover, no matter is established without a reason.
18. And if the denial of substance
is established for you without a reason,
the existence of substantiality
is also established for me without a reason.
19. If the reason exists,
the "absence of substance of things"
fails to be accomplished.
For nowhere in the world is there anything without substance.
20. Supposing that the negation is earlier,
and the negated later fails to be successful.
And being later and being simultaneous fail to be successful.
Therefore substance exists.

21. If my speech is not in the combination of causes and conditions
and also not distinct from them,
is it not the case that emptiness
is established because of the absence of the substance of things?

22. The dependent existence of things
is said to be emptiness,
for what is dependently existent
is lacking substance.

23. Suppose one artificial being were
to hinder another artificial being,
or an illusory man would hinder one brought
about by his own illusionistic power.
This negation would be just like that.

24. This speech does not exist substantially,
therefore there is no destruction of my position.
There is no inequality,
and no particular reason to be mentioned.

25. You did not construct the example
“do not make a sound” successfully.
That is the prevention of a sound by a sound,
but it is clearly not like this in the present case.

26. If substance-less things are refuted
by something substance-less,
when what is substance-less
is abandoned substance would be established.

27. The case is rather like an artificial person
preventing someone's wrong notion,
when that one thinks “this is a woman”
about an artificial woman.

28. It is rather that the example is
of the same nature as what we want to establish,
for there is no existence of sound.
We do not speak without assenting to the conventional truth.

29. If I had any thesis,
that fault would apply to me.
But I do not have any thesis,
so there is indeed no fault for me.

30. If I perceived anything by means of perception,
I would affirm or deny.
But because that does not exist,
there is no criticism applicable to me.

31. If according to you objects of some kind
are established by the epistemic instruments,
you have to indicate how according to you
the epistemic instruments are established in turn.

32a. If the epistemic instruments were established
by other epistemic instruments,
there would be an infinite regress.

32b. Neither the beginning, the middle, nor the end is established there.

33. "These are established without the epistemic instruments" —
your position is abandoned.
There is an inequality to be explained,
and you should state the special reason.

34. This is a mistaken suggestion.
For fire does not illuminate itself,
as not perceiving it is not similar
to the sight of a pot in the dark.

35. If, according to your assertion,
fire illuminates itself like others,
is it not also the case
that fire consumes itself?

36. If, according to your assertion,
fire illuminates both itself and others,
darkness will conceal both itself and others,
in the same way as fire.

37. There is no darkness in the blazing,
nor in something else in which there is blazing.
How does it do the illuminating,
as illumination is the destruction of the dark?

38. "Precisely the arising fire illuminates" —
this position is wrong.
For that very arising fire
does not connect with darkness.

39. But if an unconnected fire
were to prevent darkness,
the fire present here would prevent
the darkness in all worlds.

40. If the epistemic instruments are self-established,
the epistemic objects will be independent
of the establishment of the epistemic instruments for you,
for self-establishment is not dependent on anything else.

41. If for you the establishment
of the epistemic instruments
is independent of the objects to be known,
then those will not be the epistemic instruments of anything.
42. Moreover, if one thought "the establishment of those is dependent,"
then what is the problem here?
There would be the establishment of the established,
because what is not established does not depend on another thing.
43. If the epistemic instruments are established dependent
on the epistemic objects in every context,
then the establishment of the epistemic objects
is precisely not dependent on the epistemic instruments.
44. And if the establishment of the epistemic object
is precisely independent of the epistemic instruments,
what is achieved for you by establishing the epistemic instruments?
Their purpose is already established.
45. But then for you the establishment of the epistemic instruments
is precisely dependent on the epistemic objects.
This being so, instruments and epistemic objects
are in fact reversed for you.
46. Furthermore, if for you the establishment of the epistemic objects
is by the epistemic instruments
and the establishment of the epistemic instruments
by the epistemic objects, neither is established for you.
47. Because if these epistemic objects are established
by precisely these epistemic instruments,
and if these are to be established by the epistemic objects,
how will they establish?
48. And if these epistemic instruments are established
by precisely these epistemic objects,
and if these are to be established by the epistemic instruments,
how will they establish?
49. If the son is to be produced
by the father and if the father
is to be produced by this very son,
you have to say which produces which in this context.
50. In this context, you should say
which is the father and which is the son.
Since both have the characteristic of father and son,
this case is not clear to us.

51. The epistemic instruments are not self-established, (relating to knowledge)
nor are they mutually established or
established by other epistemic instruments,
nor are they established by the epistemic objects or established without reason.

52. If people who know the state of things
speak of the auspicious things,
the auspicious substance should be expressed
in terms of a detailed division.

53. And if the auspicious substance
is produced based on conditions,
how is this extrinsic nature of the auspicious things
in fact a substance?

54. If the substance of the auspicious things
was not produced
in dependence on anything,
there would be no religious practice.

55. There would be neither right nor wrong
nor worldly conventions.
They would be permanent and substantial;
because they are permanent they are acausal.

56. Thus there is a difficulty for the inauspicious things,
the indeterminate ones, those leading to liberation, and so forth.
To this extent everything compounded
is just not compounded for you.

57. Where someone said "a name has a referent,"
one would say "then substance exists."
You have to reply "we do not assert
a name of this kind."

58. The name "non-existent" — what is this,
something existent or again something non-existent?
For if it is existent or if it is nonexistent,
either way your position is deficient.

59. The emptiness of all things
was presented earlier.
To this extent,
this is a criticism of a non-thesis.

60. "Substance exists and it is not
a substance of things" —
the worry expressed
there is no worry.

61. If negation is of an existent thing,
is it not that emptiness is established?
Because you negate the
insubstantiality of things.

62. Or, if you negate emptiness
and that emptiness does not exist,
is your statement that "negation is of an existent thing"
then not abandoned?

63. I do not negate anything,
and there is nothing to be negated.
To this extent you misrepresent me
when you say "you negate."

64. Regarding your assertion that "expressing the negation
of a non-existent object is accomplished without speech":
in our case speech makes the non-existent known,
it does not refute it.

65. By the example of the mirage,
you once again brought up an important discussion.
In this context, too, you should listen to the demonstration
of how this example is suitable.

66. If perception existed substantially,
it would not be dependently produced.
The perception which is dependent,
however, is it not precisely emptiness?

67. If perception existed substantially,
who would remove the perception?
As far as the same pattern applies
to the remaining cases this is a non-criticism.

68. Because the case is the same,
the difficulty of the absence of the reason,
which was noted in the discussion of the method
for refuting the example of the mirage, has already been answered by this.

69. Because the case is the same,
the difficulty of the reason in the three times
has already been answered by this.
The proponent of emptiness obtains the counter reason of the three times.

70. For whom there is emptiness,
there are all things.
For whom there is no emptiness
there is nothing whatsoever.

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I venerate the one who taught emptiness, dependent origination, and the middle way as one thing, the incomparable Buddha. This is the end of the verses of the Venerable Nāgārjuna, who composed the 450 verses. It was written down by the noble Dharmakīrti in the way he obtained it, for the sake of all sentient beings.

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